SaaS窘境[欣赏然后翻译之]
?Piaoger按：
還是SaaS窘境，只不過這次是翻譯了一篇不錯的英文Blog，翻譯的過程很苦，有些地方至今也還覺得生澀，慢慢改吧。
不過怎么說，收獲良多，無論是SaaS，還是Disruptive Innovation, 抑或English。
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SaaS窘境
Software as a Service (SaaS) presents a classic “disruptive innovation.” Of course, in 2010 that’s not new news.
軟件即服務(wù)(SaaS)展示出經(jīng)典的”破壞性創(chuàng)新”。當(dāng)然，在2010這并不是什么新聞。
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What is remarkable is how closely the SaaS market’s evolution matches the definition of a disruptive technology that was described by Harvard Business School professor Clayton Christensen in The Innovator’s Dilemma (he later replaced the term with “disruptive innovation” in his subsequent book, The Innovator’s Solution). In fact, the SaaS dilemma that incumbent software vendors currently face is playing out almost page-for-page from Christensen’s books. As a result, we can use the disruptive innovation framework to gain insight into what’s to come in enterprise software.
值得注意的是，SaaS市場的進(jìn)化與哈佛商業(yè)學(xué)院教授Clayton Christensen在The Innovator’s Dilemma一書中破壞性技術(shù)的定義是如此吻合(在其后的The Innovator’s solution一書中，他改為破壞性創(chuàng)新)。事實(shí)上，處于主導(dǎo)地位軟件廠商現(xiàn)在所面臨的SaaS困境在Christensen的書中幾乎可以得到完全演繹。正因?yàn)檫@樣，我們可以借助破壞性創(chuàng)新框架以探討企業(yè)軟件所要面臨的處境。
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After a decade of deriding SaaS technology as too simple, functionally incomplete and insecure, vendors such as Microsoft, Oracle, SAP and thousands of incumbent “on-premise” software vendors are now embracing SaaS. It’s an awkward embrace – one that threatens to cannibalize existing revenue steams, divert resources and eat up profits.
在多年嘲笑SaaS技術(shù)是如此簡單、功能匱乏并且不安全之后，Microsoft、Oracle、SAP和成千主導(dǎo)的” on-premise”軟件廠商正在接受它（這是一種令人難堪的接受：它危及收入流、轉(zhuǎn)移資源并吞噬利潤）。
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Of course, the innovator’s dilemma doesn’t destroy every incumbent. These incumbent market leaders are powerful, resilient innovators themselves. But for armchair quarterbacks like us, this the next five years will present a fascinating game to watch.
當(dāng)然，創(chuàng)新者窘境并會不毀滅所有的主導(dǎo)者。這些主導(dǎo)市場的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者本身就是強(qiáng)大和堅(jiān)韌的創(chuàng)新者。但是對于我們這些紙上談兵的人來說，今后的五年給我們準(zhǔn)備了一場精彩的好戲。
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What is a Disruptive Innovation?
何為破壞性創(chuàng)新？
Disruptive innovation refers to new solutions – often technologies – that through a new delivery model, alternate pricing model or target market segment are able to disrupt existing competitive dynamics dramatically. For example, SaaS offers a new delivery model (i.e. hosted “in the cloud”), a new pricing model (i.e. subscription) and initially targeted smaller customers.
破壞性創(chuàng)新與新的解決方案（通常是技術(shù)）相關(guān)，通過一種新的交付方式、可供選擇的收費(fèi)模式或目標(biāo)市場細(xì)分有可能戲劇性地破壞當(dāng)前的動態(tài)競爭。例如，SaaS提供了新的交付方式（即托管在“云中“）、新的收費(fèi)模式（即訂閱）而且起初總是面向更小的客戶群。
注：動態(tài)競爭
http://wiki.mbalib.com/wiki/%E5%8A%A8%E6%80%81%E7%AB%9E%E4%BA%89%E7%90%86%E8%AE%BA
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Initially, these disruptors target the least profitable customer segments – typically smaller or unsophisticated buyers. These are the only customers whose requirements are limited enough to accept the bare bones feature-set of the new system. Meanwhile, they appreciate the new model (i.e. it’s cheap and easy to get started). We certainly saw this in SaaS as small businesses or autonomous departments adopted customer relationship management (CRM) systems like Salesforce.com as early as 1999. For them, SaaS CRM was “good enough.”
起初，這些破壞者面向利潤最薄的客戶細(xì)分（通常是小眾或菜鳥級的購買者）。新系統(tǒng)中少的得不能再少特征集，就能滿足他們的需求。比較而言，他們喜歡這種新的模式（便宜而且易于上手）。在SaaS 中，我們的確看到，早在1999年就有小業(yè)務(wù)或自治部門就采用了類似于Salesforce.com的客戶關(guān)系管理（CRM）系統(tǒng)。對他們來說，SaaS CRM足矣。
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The disruptive innovation cycle applied to SaaS-----------------------------------------------------------------
Over time, however, disruptive innovators improve their performance and feature-set and can meet the needs of more sophisticated customers. Combine that with a little buzz around their new model (e.g. everybody’s talking about cloud computing these days), and the incumbent vendors start to take note. Of course, the incumbent still has plenty of ammunition to dismiss the new technology, since it remains functionally deficient relative to incumbent products and the most demanding customer segments (e.g. SaaS penetration into the ERP market remains limited).
然而，隨著時間的推移，通過提升性能和增加特征，破壞性創(chuàng)新已經(jīng)可以滿足更多高級客戶的需求。何況，還有圍繞著新模式的嘰嘰喳喳（比如這些天每個人都在談?wù)撛朴?jì)算），以及主導(dǎo)廠商也開始關(guān)注。當(dāng)然，主導(dǎo)者依然有充足的彈藥去擊退新的技術(shù)，因?yàn)樵谕鲗?dǎo)產(chǎn)品相比和大多數(shù)要求嚴(yán)格的細(xì)分市場來說，它在功能上依然有缺陷（比如，SaaS依舊很難打入ERP市場）。
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I’ll posit that SaaS is now entering the penultimate – and most contentious – stage of disruption. At this point, the innovators start to gain serious momentum. Their products approach functional parity and they begin to steal substantial market share. The incumbents finally get serious about defending their traditional markets by releasing their own version of the innovation (in the case of SaaS, that means true web-based, on-demand, cloud computing, not just hosted client/server software). Unfortunately, it is often too late. Incumbents remain apprehensive about cannibalizing existing revenue and they face challenges replicating the innovation. Typically, most incumbents stagnate, decline and fade into obscurity. Only a few nimbly transition to the new model.
我將假設(shè)SaaS正在進(jìn)入倒數(shù)第二（也是最容易引起爭議）的破壞階段。這時候，創(chuàng)新者開始具有非同小可的動能。他們的產(chǎn)品接近于功能對等并開始偷偷獲得實(shí)質(zhì)性的市場份額。主導(dǎo)者終于緊張起來，通過發(fā)布創(chuàng)新版本來保護(hù)他們的傳統(tǒng)市場（假設(shè)SaaS意味著真正的基于網(wǎng)絡(luò)、按需、云計(jì)算，而不僅僅是托管的Client/Server軟件）。不幸的是，這通常都太晚了。主導(dǎo)廠商擔(dān)心會影響到他們的當(dāng)前的收益，同時還要面臨復(fù)制創(chuàng)新的挑戰(zhàn)。一般來說，大多數(shù)主導(dǎo)者都會停滯不前、墮落并消失在昏暗之中。僅有少數(shù)主導(dǎo)者能夠敏捷地轉(zhuǎn)變到新的模式。
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The innovator now becomes the incumbent and new innovators emerge. The cycle repeats.
這些創(chuàng)新者現(xiàn)在變成了主導(dǎo)者，然后新的創(chuàng)新者出現(xiàn)。周而復(fù)始。
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SaaS Disruption Battles are Well Underway
SaaS破壞之戰(zhàn)還在繼續(xù)。
Christensen mentions Salesforce.com in his second book, The Innovator’s Solution:
This company, with its inexpensive, simple, Internet-based system, is disrupting the leading providers of customer relationship management software, such as Siebel Systems.
Christensen他的第二本書The Innovator’s Solution中提到了Salesforce.com：
這個公司，以它廉價的、簡潔的和基于因特網(wǎng)的系統(tǒng)，正在破壞客戶關(guān)系管理軟件的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)提供商，比如Siebel Systems。
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I worked at another leading CRM vendor back when Salesforce.com was just a start-up. I remember meetings where executives derided the system as a toy. Most Salesforce.com implementations were just a half dozen users and most customers paid their subscription fees with a credit card (Gasp!). Since then, Salesforce.com has exceeded $1 billion in revenue and incumbent market-leader Siebel Systems sold out to Oracle after hitting tough times.
在Saleforce.com剛剛起步的時候，我在另外一家居于領(lǐng)導(dǎo)地位的CRM廠商工作。我記得在會議上，管理層總嘲笑這個系統(tǒng)只是個玩具。大多數(shù)Saleforce.com的實(shí)施，就那么幾個用戶，而且大多數(shù)的用戶都用信用卡支付訂閱的費(fèi)用（Gasp!）。從此，Salesforce.com已經(jīng)擁有超過10億美元的年收入，而市場的主導(dǎo)廠商Siebel System卻陷入困境而出售給Oracle。
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While Salesforce.com in the CRM market is the best example, the SaaS dilemma is playing out in numerous software markets. Gmail and Google Apps are nascent yet serious threats to Microsoft’s Outlook/Exchange and Office cash cows. We use both of the Google services extensively. NetSuite is a contender in enterprise resource planning (ERP), but hasn’t dented SAP or Oracle too badly as of yet.
Salesforce.com在CRM市場是最好的例子，與此同時，SaaS窘境還在許多的軟件市場延續(xù)。尚乳臭未干的Gmail和Google Apps威脅著Microsoft的Outlook/Exchange和Office現(xiàn)金奶牛。我們普遍使用著這兩種服務(wù)。NetSuite是企業(yè)資源管理（ERP）的競爭者，但還沒有能危及到SAP或Oracle。
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Most interesting, however, is how this same battle is being waged by innovators in so many lesser followed market segments: SaaS construction project management, SaaS electronic medical records, SaaS property management, SaaS retail point of sale. The list goes on…
然而，最有趣的是，同樣的戰(zhàn)爭，創(chuàng)新者在眾多少擁有較少跟隨者的細(xì)分市場將如何開戰(zhàn)：SaaS 建筑項(xiàng)目管理、SaaS電子病歷記錄、SaaS財(cái)產(chǎn)管理、SaaS零售賣點(diǎn)管理。名單還在變長ing。。。
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Most SaaS Shortcomings are Addressed
SaaS被詬病的缺點(diǎn)
As I mentioned earlier, I believe we are entering the final stages of SaaS disruption. The SaaS model and its proponents have not defeated the incumbents, but SaaS solutions have reached functional parity to the point where incumbent derisions are starting to fall on deaf ears.
正如之前所提到的，我相信我們正在進(jìn)入SaaS破壞的最后階段。盡管SaaS模式和它的擁護(hù)者還沒有擊敗主導(dǎo)者，SaaS解決方案在功能上的對等已經(jīng)達(dá)到了可以無需理睬主導(dǎo)廠商嘲笑的程度。
Let’s examine each of the top five objections to SaaS:
讓我們逐一審視反對SaaS的5個最大的理由：
??????? 瀏覽器的交互性不夠。當(dāng)Web程序需要整頁刷新以完成事務(wù)，這是事實(shí)，但是JavaScript，AJAX，Adobe Flex和其他Web UI技術(shù)的成熟可以解決這個問題。HTML5將了結(jié)這個問題。我發(fā)現(xiàn)我的SaaS程序比任何” on-premise”程序都快并值得依賴。
??????? 托管的數(shù)據(jù)不夠安全。這一點(diǎn)常讓我迷惑，因?yàn)槿绱硕嗟娜嗽缭谑曛熬鸵呀?jīng)習(xí)慣了網(wǎng)上銀行。很少的系統(tǒng)能夠比金融交易更有價值。更況且，很少有軟件購買者有能力實(shí)現(xiàn)與具有與專業(yè)的SaaS數(shù)據(jù)中心同樣的安全基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施。
??????? 不可能集成SaaS。誠然，很少的SaaS提供商開發(fā)API，并且沒有針對SaaS的中間件。如今，API集成到SaaS程序還不是一件小事，但是它不會有” on-premise”集成更難。我本來應(yīng)該知道的；我們剛剛成功完成了SaaS市場提供商Marketo的集成。
??????? 無法定制SaaS系統(tǒng)。再次聲明，事情正在改變。盡管許多SaaS程序依然被完整 “打包“，但很多廠商已經(jīng)成功把它們定位為benefit（即”提供最佳實(shí)踐“）。同時，SaaS定制工具正慢慢成熟。Salesforce.com已經(jīng)建立了一整套開發(fā)環(huán)境：force.com.
??????? 大公司想擁有軟件，而不是出租。盡管這在某些情況下依然是事實(shí)，但是在這個經(jīng)濟(jì)體系中中，訂金的可續(xù)性是非常有吸引力。它使得廠商有更多責(zé)任去爭取未來訂金。我不相信，這對大企業(yè)來說會展示出具備強(qiáng)有力的競爭力。
Incumbents are Now Challenged to Counter SaaS
面對SaaS，主流廠商飽受挑戰(zhàn)
Now that SaaS vendors and incumbents are locked in a real battle – the gloves are off and incumbents are releasing their own SaaS systems – our analysis turns to the big challenges that incumbents will face. Let’s examine the five most significant characteristics of SaaS systems, and then explore why they are great for SaaS purists and a real challenge for incumbent on-premise vendors.
現(xiàn)在，SaaS廠商和主導(dǎo)者卷入一場真正的戰(zhàn)斗中（手套已經(jīng)摘掉，主導(dǎo)者正發(fā)布他們自己的SaaS系統(tǒng)），我們的分析轉(zhuǎn)向主導(dǎo)者將面臨的巨大挑戰(zhàn)。讓我們審視SaaS系統(tǒng)最顯著的5大特性，然后解釋為什么對SaaS擁躉是很棒的，而對主導(dǎo)的” on-premise”廠商則是一個真正的挑戰(zhàn)。
| Great for SaaS companies | Tough for incumbents | |
| Browser-based | They can promote the benefits of not installing and maintaining client-side software. Plus anyone can use a web browser! | Moving to a web-based architecture is a near-complete rewrite. "Web-enabled" options are temporary, at best. |
| Subscription pricing | Not needing to justify a big purchase up front means fewer approvals and fewer risk-averse buyers to assuage. Also, great recurring revenue. | This is the core cannibalization issue: moving to subscription pricing will stall growth and maybe lead to revenue declines for some time. |
| Multi-tenant architecture | With all users on one codebase and database, changes are made in one location, but roll out globally. Also, computing resources are shared. | With thousands of installs, it's impossible to consolidate. There are incremental benefits to multi-tenancy, but the legacy customers remain. |
| Rapid release cycles | With changes being made to one codebase/database, releases can be rolled out weekly, even nightly. More releases = better products. | The quarterly, bi-yearly or annual release cycle is deeply ingrained in the DNA of an on-premise development organization. |
| Bought by business, not IT | It's far easier to sell to business units with their own budget, without the need for IT approval or budget. Faster sales cycles = growth. | IT relationships are a core advantage of incumbents. With SaaS, those relationships are less relevant - a competitive barrier is lifted. |
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| Great for SaaS companies | Tough for incumbents | |
| 基于Web | 無需安裝和維護(hù)客戶端軟件。而且每個人都用瀏覽器。 | 遷移到基于Web的架構(gòu)相當(dāng)于重寫。“可網(wǎng)絡(luò)化“選項(xiàng)只是最多只是暫時的。 |
| 訂閱付費(fèi) | 無須為大采購預(yù)付款進(jìn)行辯解，意味著需要更少建議，和更少的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)厭惡者要去安撫。同時還代表著常續(xù)的收入 | 這是一種同室操戈：轉(zhuǎn)向訂閱可能減緩發(fā)展并可能導(dǎo)致收入下降 |
| 多租戶架構(gòu) | 由于所有用戶使用同一套代碼和數(shù)據(jù)庫，一處改變而全局批量更新。同時，計(jì)算資源是共享的。 | 數(shù)千個安裝是不可能去合并的。盡管多租戶有這些好處，但歷史用戶還在。 |
| 快速發(fā)布周期 | 由于所有用戶使用同一套代碼和數(shù)據(jù)庫，每周都可以發(fā)布更新，甚至是晚上。更多的版本發(fā)布=更好的產(chǎn)品 | 一季度、半年或一年的發(fā)布周期已經(jīng)是” on-premise”開發(fā)機(jī)構(gòu)根深蒂固的DNA了。 |
| Bought by business, not IT | 讓每個商業(yè)分支使用自己的預(yù)算變得容易，而無需IT批準(zhǔn)或者預(yù)算。更快的周期=成長 | IT關(guān)系是主導(dǎo)者核心優(yōu)勢。利用SaaS，這些關(guān)系就沒那么無法避免（一個競爭壁壘并解除）。 |
?
? It’s Not Over Yet – Not Even Close
戰(zhàn)斗還沒有完-甚至還沒有接近尾聲
Microsoft, Oracle and SAP still own the large enterprise market and the SME market. In hundreds of niche software markets, on-premise incumbents dominate. Even ten to fifteen years into the evolution of SaaS, SaaS vendors still possess minimal market share relative to incumbent vendors. While still powerful and often growing, all of these incumbents face the daunting challenge of SaaS disruption. Moreover, each of the major incumbents has started in earnest on credible SaaS offerings.
Microsoft，Oracle和SAP依然擁有很大的企業(yè)用戶市場和中小型企業(yè)（SME）市場。在數(shù)百個利基軟件市場中，”on-premise”主導(dǎo)還處于支配位置。盡管在經(jīng)歷了10到15年的進(jìn)化后， SaaS相對于主導(dǎo)者來說，依然只能擁有很小的市場份額。當(dāng)它們依舊強(qiáng)大且繼續(xù)成長，所有這些主導(dǎo)者都正視SaaS破壞挑戰(zhàn)的恐嚇。此外，主導(dǎo)者已經(jīng)開始認(rèn)真地提供可靠的SaaS。
Note: 利基市場指向那些被市場中的統(tǒng)治者/有絕對優(yōu)勢的企業(yè)忽略的某些細(xì)分市場，指企業(yè)選定一個很小的產(chǎn)品或服務(wù)領(lǐng)域，集中力量進(jìn)入并成為領(lǐng)先者，從當(dāng)?shù)厥袌龅饺珖俚饺?#xff0c;同時建立各種壁壘，逐漸形成持久的競爭優(yōu)勢。 選擇一個細(xì)分的消費(fèi)群體，獲得最大的邊際收益
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Microsoft has released Microsoft Dynamics CRM Online – the first Dynamics family application to be offered in a SaaS model. Microsoft has also released Microsoft Office Online as a counter to Google Docs.
微軟已經(jīng)發(fā)布了Microsoft Dynamics CRM Online （第一個以SaaS模式提供的動態(tài)系列應(yīng)用）。Microsoft還發(fā)布了Microsoft Office Online以對抗Google Docs。
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Oracle, meanwhile, continues to grow its Oracle OnDemand solution set. While much of Oracle OnDemand consists of managed services for traditional on-premise solutions, their SaaS CRM offering (acquired through the Siebel deal) is true SaaS. So too are other solutions they acquired in recent years.
同樣，Oracle還在增加它的Oracle OnDemand解決方案集。Oracle OnDemand包含了為傳統(tǒng)” on-premise”解決方案所提供的可管理服務(wù)，而他們所提供的SaaS CRM（通過收購Siebel）則是真正的SaaS。他們近年來收購的其他解決方案也是如此。
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Finally, SAP’s Business ByDesign appears to be a pure SaaS, on-demand offering that is operating independently from the SAP mothership. Our own conversations with SAP employees have shown that the company is maintaining an arms-length relationship with the Business ByDesign team so that this in-house “start-up” can truly function as a nimble SaaS entity, unconstrained by SAP’s on-premise legacy.
最后，SAP的Bussiness ByDesign看起來是一個純粹的SaaS，按需交付、與SAP母艦獨(dú)立運(yùn)作。在我們與SAP員工的交談中可以看出，SAP與Business ByDesign 團(tuán)隊(duì)保持一定距離，以便使這個機(jī)構(gòu)內(nèi)部的 “Start=up”能夠作為敏捷的SaaS實(shí)體運(yùn)作，而不必拘泥于SAP的” on-premise”傳統(tǒng)。
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If the disruption examples and case studies in Christensen’s book are a guide, we can expect to see a massive number of incumbent vendors stall, fade and become irrelevant over the next decade. Others will deftly navigate the transition.
如果破壞的例子和Christensen書中的個案研究具有指導(dǎo)意義，我們會看到大量的主導(dǎo)者廠商在下一個十年內(nèi)停滯不前，消逝然后變得毫不相關(guān)。其他的主導(dǎo)廠商則能敏捷地完成遷移。
In our comments section below, I’d like to start a conversation about which incumbent vendors will fade and which will transition. Please share your opinion.
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?原文：
?http://www.softwareadvice.com/articles/enterprise/the-software-as-a-service-dilemma-104071/
Piaoger后記：
On-premise沒有硬譯，它是與On-demande相對應(yīng)的一種模式。
上一篇與SaaS/Disruptive Innovation相關(guān)的文章是從Adobe Subscription editions扯到破壞性創(chuàng)新
轉(zhuǎn)載于:https://www.cnblogs.com/piaoger/archive/2011/04/18/2020269.html
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